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Some of the implications for law of recent discoveries in neuroscience are considered in a new program
established by the MacArthur Foundation. A group of neuroscientists, lawyers, philosophers, and jurists are
examining issues in criminal law and, in particular, problems in responsibility and prediction and problems in
legal decision making.The Law and Neuroscience
Neuroscience started off over 100 years
ago with curious scientists studying a
most complex organ—the brain. The over-
arching interest was and continues to
be to determine how the brain does its
work. That is, scientists ask how the brain
causes human beings to perceive, think,
behave, reproduce, eat, drink, and all the
rest. Enormous advances have been
made toward this goal, and today, the
excitement in the field is palpable.
About 20 years ago, another advance
expanded the agenda. With the advent
of brain-imaging tools of all kinds—from
CT, to fMRI, MEG, ERPs, NIRS, and
more—the human brain itself could be
studied. No longer did one have to infer
from animal studies what a particular find-
ing might mean for the human condition.
Humans were now front and center and
directly under the scientist’s eye. And in
recent years, even those slippery mental
constructs, such as moral beliefs, inten-
tions, preferences, self-knowledge, and
consciousness itself, are being unpacked.
Other fields interested in the study of mind
couldn’t help but notice the advances in
neuroscience.
Basic neuroscientific research was at
this time unlocking how and when the
brain seemed to be making a person’s
decisions for action. Such decisions, neu-
roscientists discovered, are usually made
well before an animal, including a human
being, is consciously aware of the deci-
sion. And the pharmacologists were be-
ginning to see how the human condition
itself could be enhanced, modulated,
brightened, calmed, and subjected to
other modifications. With all of this and
much, much more, it became clear that
the traditional views of what it meant to412 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elbe human were under challenge. Were
some or all of the implications good?
In this context, the field of neuroethics
was born. Neuroethics is undoubtedly a
subfield of the more general study of
bioethics, but neuroethics has a greater
immediacy. The core of the discussions
in neuroethics does not deal, for example,
with who receives a liver in a transplant
case. Neuroethics instead deals with how
we are to think of ourselves (Chaterjee,
2004). The questions are endless, and the
field is currently abuzz with activity.
None of this was lost on those who
believed that the ever-advancing field of
neuroscience was beginning to challenge
our notions of crime and punishment, the
very foundations of the rules regulating
our living together in social groups. Were
the scientists, it was asked, who were en-
gaged in this field advancing the age-old
argument that our actions are wholly de-
termined by physical forces? Were they
raising fundamental questions about the
nature of what it means to be responsible
for one’s actions? Some legal scholars
hold that determinism undermines legal
responsibility and that the law cannot
ignore the threat of determinism. Other
scholars directly assert that human be-
ings are not responsible for any of our
actions (Dan-Cohen, 1992; but see Pere-
boom, 2001, contra). As Sanford Kadish
puts it, ‘‘to blame a person is to express
moral criticism, and if the person’s action
does not deserve criticism, blaming him is
a kind of falsehood, and is, to the extent
the person is injured by being blamed,
unjust to him.’’
These are large and bothersome is-
sues. Of course, they are not new or
novel. What is new is that neuroscience
may have something to say about them.sevier Inc.As we move toward a closer understand-
ing of how the brain enables action
(everything from a simple movement to
a thought) we seem to be closing in on
the idea that human beings are a deter-
mined system. That is, indeed, what
many people have come to believe,
and that is the crux of the problem con-
fronted by the emerging field of law and
neuroscience.
To study these problems, the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
funded the establishment of the Law
and Neuroscience Project in 2007. This
project, composed of approximately 40
neuroscientists, legal specialists, and
philosophers, has embarked on a 3 year
endeavor to engage in pilot research to
expand our knowledge in two major
areas in this field. The first area addresses
the question of criminal responsibility,
prediction of criminal behavior, and treat-
ment options. It includes issues concern-
ing psychopathy and drug addiction and
how these issues affect our understand-
ings of responsibility and punishment.
The second area is focused on the use of
neuroscience in legal decision making.
Despite or because of the path de-
scribed above, several cautionary notes
must be provided. The first such note is
that one must be on guard against ‘‘brain
overclaim syndrome,’’ a condition identi-
fied by Stephen Morse (Morse, 2006).
We have all seen this syndrome in action.
To some extent, it is a simple truism that
the brain is involved with all things that
comprise our human existence. It follows,
loosely, therefore, that understanding the
brain will help us understand the human
condition more fully. However, scientists
are well aware that findings may have
social or psychological implications but
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social questions.
It is a paradox that it is a duty of scien-
tists to present research findings to the
public while, at the same time, the public
over-accepts the importance of such find-
ings and even prematurely grants the sta-
tus of sheer truth to some! Recent studies
have shown, for example, that the results
of a simple experiment in cognitive psy-
chology will be more positively evaluated
and considered important if a brain scan
or two is thrown into the reporting of those
results (Weisberg et al., 2008). In a court of
law, the undisciplined use of brain scans
is a real concern. The balance between
accurate scientific reporting, on the one
hand, and the risk of ‘‘overclaim syn-
drome’’ on the other must be carefully
considered. Additionally, over-accep-
tance on the part of the jury has to be
carefully evaluated at all times. Using neu-
roscience in the courtroom, colored and
influenced by modern societies’ awe of
science, may also strengthen the judge’s
and jury’s deterministic tendencies.
These enigmatic knots, now manifest to
us, need to be untangled, and new efforts
in law and neuroscience might help us
to better do this. In what follows, I will
briefly review two main areas of interest
that correspond to the research areas in
the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience
Project. I should add that our research
networks considered dozens of other
possible projects that could yield rich
and meaningful information concerning
this skein of questions. In later years, we
hope to address many of these issues.
For now, as mentioned above, we chose
to concentrate on two areas: (1) criminal
responsibility and (2) legal decision mak-
ing in the courtroom. While each of these
is a large and complex topic, the specific
problems we will preliminarily address
are more focused subtopics located
within each of these broader areas.
Criminal Responsibility
The most salient characteristic that distin-
guishes United States criminal law from
civil law is the outcome for the defendant.
In criminal law, we call that outcome (a
sentence) ‘‘punishment.’’ In the civil law,
the goal is to compensate or make whole
the injured party. Punishment, the object
of the criminal law, implies the imposition
of some form of suffering. At the sametime, it is widely believed, that ‘‘no human
should be made to suffer if such suffering
cannot be justified by a concomitant gain
to society.’’ (Loewy, 2003; Of course, this
view, endorsed in some form by most
utilitarians, can be traced back to Jeremy
Bentham.) We tend to forget that it is soci-
ety through the power of the state that
metes out a punishment and not the
victim of the crime. Criminal conduct is
seen as an offense against society,
against our norms; it is seen as an offense
against all of us.
Punishment here collides with the think-
ing of the neuroscientifically enlightened.
While punishment allegedly has many
purposes—such as rehabilitation, deter-
rence, restraint, and retribution—retribu-
tion appears to be preponderant, even if
it is not so perceived (Carlsmith, 2008). If
determinism is correct, retributive punish-
ment is not only nonsensical, it is immoral.
The first order of business in law and
neuroscience, then, is to examine deter-
minism and investigate how decisions to
act (to produce behaviors) come about.
We face the question of whether we
blame the antecedent forces working on
the brain or whether we blame the person.
Neuroscience is making inroads into
understanding how the circuits and logic
of neurons carry out behaviors. We under-
stand more about certain thoughts and
behaviors than others. One thing we are
certain of is that the ‘‘work’’ in the brain
happens before we are consciously aware
of our mental struggles. Researchers
have, since as early as 1965, advanced
our understanding of the fact that much
of the work is done at the subconscious
level (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Libet
et al., 1979; Soon et al., 2008). A decision,
for example, can be predicted several
seconds before the subject consciously
decides. If it is simply the brain, working
up from its unconscious neural elements,
that causes a person to act (even before
he or she is aware of making a decision),
how can we hold any person liable for his
or her mental decisions? To hold someone
responsible for his or her actions, one
must find a ‘‘there’’ there. Is a little guy pull-
ing the levers in your head producing a
free-floating you? Modern neuroscience,
of course, tells us the answer is ‘‘no.’’
The brain is a highly parallel and distrib-
uted system with literally millions of deci-
sions being made simultaneously. TheNeuron 60,parallel-processing organism—a human
being—appears to other human beings
remarkably like a self-motivated, morally
coherent, conscious, decision-making
agent. This assignment of agency by
human beings to complex systems is not
limited to other human beings. Every
day, we speak of the stock market, a cor-
poration, or even a nation in such personal
terms.
This discussion is not, surprisingly,
crucial to determining where we locate
‘‘responsibility.’’ Responsibility reflects
a rule, a rule that emerges out of one or
more agents interacting in a social con-
text. Responsibility is not in the brain; it
is in the social contract. Responsibility
reflects the hope we share that each
person will follow certain rules.
Of course, the foregoing is an argument,
not, by any means, a settled view. If the
foregoing view were adopted, substantial
implications for the law would follow. After
all, almost anyone—diminished through
disease, genetics, and social-cultural
forces—can follow a rule. Schizophrenics
and felons stop at red lights.
Over the years, the system of United
States law, which is derived from English
common law, has developed and reified
conceptions of what it means to be guilty
of a crime. The complex set of ideas that
has emerged was largely established
during times when few worried about no-
tions of determined brains or social rules.
The view of humans, embodied in the law,
was simple and straightforward. The hu-
man, according to this view, is a practical
reasoner functioning in a normal environ-
ment. In order to be guilty of a crime, a
person must be in a certain mental state,
called the mens rea (guilty mind), neces-
sary to have committed a crime and have
accomplished the criminal act, called the
actus reus.
From a neuroscientific point of view, the
criminal act or actus reus component of
the crime is of less interest than the
mens rea concept. The mental state of
having a ‘‘guilty mind’’ (largely at the time
of the commission of the crime) carries
within it the notion that humans have
‘‘general intentions’’ and ‘‘specific inten-
tions.’’ Different crimes require different
levels of intent for a conviction. Put sim-
ply, current law envisions a criminal de-
fendant as a free-willing, rational creature
operating in a normal brain environmentNovember 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 413
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specific) to accomplish a crime. But is
this an accurate description of the
criminal?
Adding to the intense interest in this
subject are new studies suggesting that
specific brain areas are activated that are
associated with intentions to act (Haynes
et al., 2007). If those brain areas are dam-
aged or nonfunctional, does that suggest
the person should be held exculpable for
a criminal act? In addition, new studies
suggest that specific brain circuits are in-
volved in certain moral judgments (Greene
et al., 2004). If these circuits are impaired,
should such a person be excused under
several insanity doctrines as incapable of
knowing right from wrong? Other studies
show that a sense of fairness can be dis-
rupted by momentarily disabling the right
frontal cortex. For example, recent exper-
iments using what is called ‘‘the ultimatum
game’’ suggest that disruption of the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
by low-frequency repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation greatly lowers a
test subject’s ability to reject an intention-
ally unfair offer (Knoch, 2006). Interest-
ingly, subjects still knew the offers were
unfair—they simply couldn’t resist taking
them.
Such research leads to the question of
whether felons who have damage in such
regions should be excused for their oppor-
tunistic behavior. Finally, should psycho-
paths, a group that makes up about 20%
of our high-security male prison popula-
tion, be considered as suffering from a
brain disorder that prevents them from
forming an empathetic response and un-
derstanding (even comprehending) the
feelings of others? If so, do we want to
excuse them under insanity or diminished
capacity doctrines and thereby judge
them as exculpable and let them go? Do
we want the state to house them in a differ-
ent kind of facility? The issues seem end-
less. We are at a major crossroads.
Of course, that is not the main objective
of the work examining special populations
such as psychopaths and addicts. The
goal is to understand their abnormal
states and attempt to design therapies
and other interventions that might lead
them to so-called normal status. In a re-
cent electrophysiological study of at-risk
children, subjects who came from low
socioeconomic environments were found414 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elto have a pattern of brain activity similar to
adult patients with frontal lobe damage
(Kishiyama et al., 2008). Could it be,
then, that key social and developmental
factors lead to brain abnormalities that
then result in a higher risk of criminal ac-
tivity? Could interventions be developed
to stop such a progression?
Untangling all of these interactive
complexities is a major charge of the
MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Pro-
ject. How are we to view our very nature?
Neuroscientists might, on the one hand,
aimlessly continue to engage in research
and publish results. They might, on the
other hand, be cognizant of the fact that
neuroscience itself is located at the center
of complex and crucial societal issues.
As the philosopher Gary Watson recently
reminded us, ‘‘we are the law.’’ Our view
of what it means to be human is changing,
and our view of justice will likely change in
conformity with it.
Legal Decision Making
A second major area of research in law
and neuroscience, balanced against the
long-tem theoretical interests described
so far, concerns legal decision making
as it currently operates in courtrooms.
The first area we have identified—the
question of criminal responsibility itself—
exists against the backdrop of whether
or not and how such research should be
allowed in the courtroom. That backdrop
defines the second area of our research.
Perhaps of most immediate and practi-
cal concern here is the admission into
evidence or use of new brain-imaging
technologies and the reports they gener-
ate. Should information on the specific
physical states and capacities of individ-
uals be evaluated by the judge or by the
jury? Further—and this is the key issue—
is such information probative or prejudi-
cial? Can a brain scan presented in a legal
proceeding be over-accepted by a jury
(Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2008)?
While the public considers science as
a field dealing with certainties, scientific
observations actually reflect probabilities
of occurrence. The proper representation
of scientific finding is difficult. In a sense,
the nature of science has been misinter-
preted for years.
How does scientific evidence get into
court? Strict criteria regulate the introduc-
tion of scientific evidence, but these havesevier Inc.changed fairly often as science has
evolved. The history of the introduction
and evaluation of scientific evidence by
United States courts is fascinating and
complex (Rakoff, 2008). Federal Judge
Jed Rakoff, of the Southern District of
New York, recently provided a brilliant
analysis of the ever-changing rules con-
cerning the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
Over the years, the desire of legal coun-
sel on any side to introduce science in
court has grown exponentially. Unfortu-
nately, much of it has been ‘‘junk’’ sci-
ence. For example, Rakoff describes the
history of the rejection of lie-detection
procedures in United States courts. This
rejection seems justified. A recent report
from the National Academy of Sciences
deemed lie detection unscientific and
unreliable (National Academy of Science,
2003). Even though every jurisdiction
except one in the United States prohibits
the introduction of lie-detection evidence,
it is still extensively used in the govern-
ment, military, and private enterprise.
The risk that science rejected for use in
courts, due to the stringent requirements
for accuracy, may still be used widely in
society for other purposes is always
present.
Ensuring that only sound science is
used in the courtroom and that such
science is used in appropriate ways is
a work in progress. At one time, for exam-
ple, Rakoff reminds us that American
courts accepted that psychiatric evidence
based on psychoanalytic theory had
reached the level of scientific certainty
sufficient to allow its introduction into
evidence. The way that judges and juries
hear scientific evidence is through the
admission of expert testimony, often
accompanied by the expert’s exhibits
(charts, diagrams, medical images, and
the like). In American courts, the judge
has become the ‘‘gatekeeper’’ and allows
‘‘good’’ scientific evidence into the case
while preventing ‘‘bad’’ scientific evidence
(as well as irrelevant evidence) from enter-
ing the case. How should a judge, trained
in the law, make such a determination?
The evolution of the insanity defense in
the United States shows the development
of the process by which a judge decides
whether to admit scientific evidence and
exemplifies some of the problems related
to the intersection of science and law.
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against the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, Robert Peel, Sir Nicolas Con-
yngham Tindal, Chief Justice of the Com-
mon Pleas, established what has become
known as the M’Naghten Rule. The jury,
under this rule, must consider whether
the defendant was laboring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of
the act or that the act was wrong. This def-
inition has gone through several major
reinterpretations in various jurisdictions
in the United States. You can imagine the
avalanche of expert testimony a judge or
jury is likely to hear concerning whether
a certain defendant is ‘‘sane’’ or ‘‘insane.’’
The current standards for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony in all types of
situations come from Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. According to
Daubert, federal judges must screen pro-
posed expert testimony and allow in only
that evidence that is relevant and consists
of valid scientific information. This
‘‘screening’’ procedure is driven by Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702. Federal judges
(and many state judges applying similar
standards) use several criteria to analyze
whether expert testimony is, as Judge
Rakoff noted, ‘‘grounded in the methods
and procedures of science.’’ The criteria
that govern the admissibility of expert tes-
timony shape the presentation of scien-
tific information. Communicating the sub-
tleties of scientific findings in the context
of a courtroom adversarial proceeding
(constrained by the rules of admissibility,
discussed above) is indeed daunting.
Summary
A long and winding road is unfolding
before us. Every day, neuroscience is
making advances in understanding the
human mind. There are many questions
that will be fruitful subjects of research,
and many others may be beyond the initial
scope of the MacArthur Law and Neuro-
science Project. For example, one of the
law’s principal aims is to regulate behav-
ior by appealing to and relying on intuitive
notions of right and wrong and notions of
justice. These intuitive notions are, ofcourse, based on a model of the person
embedded in legal thinking. Questions
about the nature of the person, the bases
of moral reasoning, and the effects of
punishment have the potential to signifi-
cantly reshape legal philosophy.
Apart from suggesting what might be
seen as earth-shattering adjustments to
the legal system, there are numerous
questions, as discussed above, on how,
within the current framework of the law,
to balance the introduction and use of
neuroscientific evidence against its po-
tential for ‘‘unduly’’ prejudicing a party.
Such evidence is, of course, informative,
but we must work to further understand
whether jurors, judges, and lawmakers
suffer from ‘‘brain overclaim’’ syndrome
and how to counter it. Further, the neuro-
logical basis of bias, its role in the law in
terms of procedural and substantive fair-
ness, and possible means to counteract
bias must be studied.
We in the United States are not alone in
this enterprise. Other national and trans-
national efforts are trying to address these
questions in light of differing legal sys-
tems. For example, the European Science
Foundation (ESF) funded a European
Neuroscience and Society Network
(ENSN) in late 2007. The London School
of Economics is also sponsoring Brain,
Self, and Society, a 3 year project funded
by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) of the United Kingdom.
Further, the Oxford Centre for Neuro-
ethics, funded through the Wellcome
Trust’s Biomedical Ethics Strategic
Awards program, recently received fund-
ing for a 5 year project on neuroethical
research.
It is the human mind that can work in
strange ways, ways that produce antiso-
cial behavior such as embezzlement,
fraud, theft, assault, rape, and murder,
to name only a few crimes with which so-
ciety is rightly concerned. Neuroscience,
like it or not, is enmeshed with the core
issues of criminal law. From the funda-
mental and enduring question of criminal
responsibility to the immediate issues of
representing science in today’s court-
room, the publicly spirited neuroscientistNeuron 60must consider these issues and help
guide our society to the proper use of its
accurate and growing base of scientific
knowledge. Keep an eye on the progress
we make by tuning into our website
(http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.
org).
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